Uncategorized – Decision Height

A Go-Around at 425 feet: What Really Happened to IndiGo Flight 6E2155?

June 8, 2026June 8, 2026 admin Leave a comment

By Jacob K Philip

There was a detailed report in The Times of India on Sunday, about a go-around executed on Thursday, June 4th, by an IndiGo Airbus A321, flight 6E2155 (registration VT-IBB), operating from Pune to Ahmedabad.

The newspaper reported that passengers were left panicked when the aircraft climbed away after appearing to be close to landing. According to the report, the pilot later announced that air traffic control (ATC) had found the aircraft’s speed too high for landing, raising the possibility that it could overshoot the runway. The aircraft therefore discontinued the approach and attempted a second landing.

This prompted a review of the flight data, particularly the aircraft’s approach profile as recorded by Flightradar24, a popular flight-tracking platform.

According to Flightradar24 data, the aircraft was approaching Ahmedabad’s Runway 23 on Thursday morning when it initiated a go-around at 10:23:09 a.m., at an altitude of approximately 425 feet. At that time, its speed was 137 knots (253.7 km/h).

For an Airbus A321 on final approach, a speed of 137 knots is not unusually high. Depending on aircraft weight, wind conditions and configuration, the normal final approach speed for this type typically ranges between 135 and 150 knots. An altitude of 425 feet is also well within the normal range for a stabilized final approach.

Despite this, the aircraft discontinued the landing and climbed away.

To understand why, a replay of aircraft movements at Ahmedabad Airport around that time was examined.

As the IndiGo aircraft descended towards Runway 23 and reached 425 feet, a Tecnam P2010 TDI aircraft (registration VT-XIA), operated by Ahmedabad-based Air Taxi, was seen moving at about 11.1 km/h near a taxiway connected to the runway.

At that moment, the distance between the IndiGo aircraft and the Tecnam aircraft was approximately 1.12 km. The Tecnam was about 131 metres from the runway centreline when the IndiGo aircraft initiated the go-around.

These measurements indicate that, assuming both aircraft maintained their respective speeds and directions, the Tecnam would not have entered the runway before the IndiGo aircraft reached that section of the airfield. However, changes in speed or clearance instructions could have altered the situation.

The available flight-tracking data therefore do not conclusively establish why the go-around was carried out. While the aircraft’s recorded speed does not appear unusually high for an Airbus A321 on final approach, the presence of another aircraft near the runway environment raises questions that cannot be conclusively answered without access to ATC recordings, airport movement data or the airline’s operational information.

However, with the data available, a more plausible explanation of the go-around is the possible conflict between the movements of the Indigo plane and the Tecnam aircraft.

jacob@indianaviationnews.net

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A Blue Light, a Misread Message and a Near Disaster at 35,000 Feet

May 29, 2026May 29, 2026 admin Leave a comment

By Jacob K Philip

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau of India (AAIB) has released its investigation report on the 14th of this month into the near-miss involving a Flydubai Boeing 737 MAX 8 operating from Dubai to Kozhikode and a Turkish Airlines Airbus A330-223F cargo aircraft flying from Chennai to Istanbul.

The incident occurred at 5:17am (IST) on Sunday, August 31, over the Arabian Sea, about 600 km west of the Gujarat coast, at an altitude of 35,000 feet.

The Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), an onboard computer-controlled safety system, issued warnings (Traffic Advisory) to the crews of both aircraft when the vertical separation between them had reduced to 836 feet and the horizontal distance was about four kilometres.

The incident highlights the risks that can arise in oceanic airspace beyond radar coverage, where air traffic control relies heavily on data-link communication between controllers and pilots. Errors in communication systems or mistakes by their operators can potentially lead to serious accidents.

Here is a short description of the events unfolded in the early morning of 31st August:

Turkish Airlines cargo flight TK6380 took off from Chennai at 3:12 a.m. At around 5:00 a.m., while cruising over the Arabian Sea at 34,000 feet and a speed of 933 km/h, the captain informed the first officer that he would be taking a controlled rest in the cockpit.

A few minutes later, the first officer sent a request to Mumbai Air Traffic Control (ATC) through the Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) system, seeking permission to climb to 36,000 feet.

Mumbai ATC received the request and rejected it shortly afterwards through a text message.

According to the AAIB report, the controller denied the request because Flydubai flight FZ249, operating from Dubai to Kozhikode, was approaching from the opposite direction at 35,000 feet along the same international route, P574, at a speed of about 844 km/h.

However, Mumbai ATC made a critical procedural error while transmitting the rejection. Instead of sending the response as a reply to the original CPDLC request, it was transmitted as a new message. As a result, the aircraft’s CPDLC system later generated a reminder notification, accompanied by an aural alert and a flashing blue light, indicating that the original request had not received a proper response.

When the reminder appeared, the first officer saw the message “REQ CLIMB FL360” displayed on the screen. Believing it to be a clearance from Mumbai ATC, he acknowledged it and initiated the climb. The report concludes that he had mistaken the aircraft’s own climb request for an ATC clearance.

At that time, the Flydubai aircraft was approaching in the opposite direction at FL350 and was 5.6 km away.

Meanwhile, another factor unexpectedly increased the safety margin. Earlier in the flight, the Flydubai aircraft had deviated slightly to the right of route P574 to avoid an area of light turbulence. As a result, it was laterally offset by about 3.7 km from the Turkish aircraft’s track.

As the Turkish cargo aircraft climbed towards the altitude occupied by the oncoming Flydubai aircraft at 35,000 feet, the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) on both aircraft detected the developing conflict. When the Turkish aircraft reached 34,164 feet, both systems generated the warning: “Traffic, Traffic.”

The Turkish captain woke up to the sound of the TCAS alert. At that moment, the vertical separation between the two aircraft had reduced to 836 feet and the distance between them was about four kilometres.

Under normal procedures, aircraft operating at these flight levels are required to maintain a minimum vertical separation of 1,000 feet.

The TCAS alert continued for 14 seconds, until 5:16:58 a.m.

By then, the aircraft had already crossed each other. The vertical separation was 692 feet and the distance between them had increased to about ten kilometres. Although the altitude difference remained below 1,000 feet, the TCAS Traffic Advisory was automatically terminated because the aircraft were rapidly moving away from each other. TCAS is based on predicted collision risk rather than a fixed altitude difference.

During the TCAS warning, the captain informed the first officer that he had control of the aircraft. On checking the cockpit displays, he realised that the aircraft was climbing. When he asked the first officer whether ATC had cleared the climb, the first officer replied that clearance had been received.

To verify this, the captain pressed the CPDLC RECALL button and reviewed the displayed messages. The only message visible was “REQ CLIMB FL360″—the climb request that had originally been sent by the crew to ATC. The reminder notification that had apparently been mistaken for a clearance message was no longer visible on the active display and had likely been archived in the system history.

Concerned by the situation, the captain discontinued the climb and levelled the aircraft at 35,000 feet instead of continuing to FL360. He then sent a CPDLC message to Mumbai ATC asking whether climb clearance had been issued. ATC replied that no such clearance had been given.

Since the first officer remained convinced that a clearance had been received, the captain sent another query to ATC. The response was the same: permission to climb had not been granted.

Although the two aircraft continued safely on their respective routes without further incident, reports submitted by the crews after landing in Istanbul and Kozhikode, together with reports from Mumbai ATC, led the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau of India (AAIB) to classify the occurrence as a serious incident and launch a formal investigation.

Safety recommendations

Following the investigation, the AAIB issued safety recommendations to Turkish Airlines, the Airports Authority of India (AAI), and Airbus.

Turkish Airlines:
a) Reinforce CPDLC procedures, through training, emphasise on verification of message content (Reminder/received from other units) before executing clearances.
b) Operation Manual of the airline may be amended by adding that, “During the controlled rest period the requests which requires cross check such as significant flight path/Flight Level changes should be avoided unless they are deemed necessary.”

Airports Authority of India:
Conduct recurrent training for controllers on the risks of sending stand-alone CPDLC uplink messages in reply to aircraft requests.

Airbus:
The safety action has already been carried out by Airbus. Airbus has stated that the system now on will not display the reminder message. (The removal was based on the consideration that the flight crew are better positioned to determine appropriate follow-up actions in the absence of an ATC response.)

jacob@indianaviationnews.net

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The hidden power of airline passenger data

May 24, 2026May 24, 2026 admin Leave a comment

By John Verghese

Airlines are no longer just flying planes.

They are becoming powerful data and AI-driven companies.

Think about your last flight.

Every time you:

search for a ticket
choose a seat
add baggage
order a meal
or use loyalty points…

you are creating data.

Airlines use this data, along with artificial intelligence and machine learning, to better understand passenger behaviour. This helps them predict what travellers want, often before they even book.

Today, airline data analytics is helping airlines:

predict travel demand
adjust ticket prices in real time
personalise offers and rewards
plan smarter flight routes
improve the customer experience
increase revenue from seats, bags, lounges, and upgrades

According to a recent Boston Consulting Group (BCG) aviation industry analysis, airlines using advanced AI and customer personalisation are improving both profitability and passenger satisfaction.

That is changing the aviation industry fast.

Loyalty programmes are also becoming smarter. Instead of simply handing out points, airlines now use AI-powered systems to send personalised offers at the right time, based on each customer’s travel habits and preferences.

The Gulf region is moving quickly too. IATA has recently highlighted the GCC’s unified aviation strategy as a major step towards better regional co-ordination and smarter use of aviation data. This could help Gulf airlines improve route planning, demand forecasting, and travel efficiency across business and tourism markets.

But there are challenges.

Airlines still need to protect customer privacy, maintain fair pricing, build trusted data systems, and ensure technology enhances the human experience rather than replacing it.

The future of aviation may not be defined only by better aircraft or bigger airports, but by how intelligently airlines use data to understand their passengers.

That shift is already happening.

John Verghese is a Senior Editor with Gulf Times, Doha, Qatar. A Communications & Content Strategy professional with 25+ years of experience across the Middle East and South Asia, Verghese specialises in editorial leadership, media communications across print, digital, and multi-platform environments. He can be reached at jverghese30@yahoo.com

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Man on the Runway, an Aborted Takeoff and an Engine Fire: A horror unsaid at Denver?

May 9, 2026May 9, 2026 admin Leave a comment

By Jacob K Philip

A Frontier Airlines plane en route from Denver, Colorado, to Los Angeles, California, struck a pedestrian on the runway at Denver International Airport Friday night, forcing the aircraft to suddenly abort takeoff, triggering a small fire and the evacuation of passengers.

The Airbus A321-271NX, an A321neo with registration N646FR, was departing from Runway 35R at 11:15 p.m. when it reportedly struck a ‘pedestrian’ crossing the runway about 30 seconds after beginning its takeoff roll.

During the takeoff run, the A321neo was approaching its decision speed — commonly known as V1 — the maximum speed at which a takeoff can still be safely aborted. The aircraft was traveling at around 235 km/h when the crew initiated a rejected takeoff.

After realizing the aircraft may have struck someone, the pilots immediately applied maximum braking and reverse thrust to stop the plane. At the time, the aircraft had 231 passengers and crew on board and was carrying about 9,525 kilograms of fuel for the 1,387-kilometer flight to Los Angeles.

The aircraft, weighing roughly 80 tonnes including passengers, fuel, and cargo, came to a sudden stop at high speed. Under such circumstances, enormous friction builds up in the braking system, often generating enough heat to cause smoke or even tire and brake fires.

However, airport authorities and several news reports specifically stated that the fire occurred in one of the aircraft’s engines and was later extinguished.

That unusual detail raises further questions about the accident and highlights gaps in the information released so far.

How did the person reportedly struck by the aircraft gain access to the active runway area inside a major international airport? How could someone cross a runway while an aircraft was accelerating for takeoff?

Who exactly was the “pedestrian” mentioned in the reports — the individual whom the pilot reportedly told air traffic control he had seen walking across the runway?

Was the person an airport employee, a passenger, a maintenance worker, or a trespasser? So far, none of the reports have clarified this.

Now, let us return to the reported engine fire.

As noted earlier, when a large aircraft aborts takeoff at high speed, it is not unusual for the landing gear, brakes, or tires to overheat and even catch fire.

But an engine fire points toward another possible scenario — that foreign objects may have entered the engine during the incident. Such an event can disrupt airflow inside the engine and trigger a compressor stall or engine surge, often accompanied by loud bangs, smoke, sparks, and, in some cases, fire.

That raises another disturbing question: what exactly entered the engine?

It is worth noting that, apart from the pilot reportedly saying he saw someone on the runway and believed the aircraft had struck the person, there has been little mention in news reports about the individual’s condition or what ultimately happened to him.

Another important factor is the height of the Airbus A321neo’s engines above the ground. Depending on aircraft weight and tire pressure, the Pratt & Whitney PW1100G or CFM LEAP-1A engines fitted on the A321neo sit only about 80 to 120 centimeters above ground level. The engine fan diameter itself is approximately 198 to 206 centimeters.

And the average adult human height ranges between 167 and 182 centimeters.

During takeoff, the engines of an A321neo ingest 500-700 kilograms of air every second. That means, the aircraft’s two engines pull in air at a rate 10,000 times more powerful than a typical household vacuum cleaner.

Given those forces, and with the aircraft moving at 235 km/h during the rejected takeoff, one cannot help but imagine — with horror — what might happen to a person caught in front of the engines.

jacob@indianaviationnews.net

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Two Aviation Disasters, One Dark Question Hanging Over

May 7, 2026May 9, 2026 admin Leave a comment

By Jacob K Philip

Eleven months after an Air India Boeing 787 crashed seconds after takeoff from Ahmedabad while operating a flight to London, attention has now turned to a similar tragedy in China four years ago — after a newly released US report suggested that the crash may have been deliberate.

A document released by the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) says the fatal crash of a China Eastern Airlines Boeing 737-800 in March 2022 could have been caused by the deliberate shutdown of both engines in flight.

The aircraft had taken off from Kunming Changshui International Airport at 2:23 pm on March 21, 2022, bound for Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport. All 132 people on board were killed.

*Search and rescue team at China Eastern Airlines crash site.*

The NTSB document, released under the US Freedom of Information Act, has intensified global debate because of its striking similarities to revelations contained in the preliminary report into the recent Air India crash.

The US agency participated in the China Eastern investigation because the aircraft was US-made. According to the report, data extracted from the aircraft’s black boxes showed that both engine fuel control switches had been moved from RUN to CUTOFF while the aircraft was cruising at 29,100 feet.

“The only explanation” for the switches being moved, the NTSB noted, was that someone intentionally changed their position, as there had been no indication of any mechanical or system malfunction before the event.

Roughly an hour after departure, the aircraft suddenly entered a steep descent. In just over two minutes, it plunged from 29,100 feet to 9,075 feet before disappearing from radar near Wuzhou in southern China.

Air traffic controllers repeatedly attempted to contact the cockpit during the descent, but there was no response.

Investigators noted that the switches were never returned to the RUN position, strengthening suspicions that the act may have been intentional.

The report also casts doubt on suggestions that the aircraft simply became uncontrollable after engine failure. Aviation experts point out that even with total loss of thrust at cruising altitude, the aircraft should have been capable of gliding forward for a considerable distance and potentially making an emergency landing.

The NTSB further revealed that the flight data recorder stopped functioning as the aircraft descended through 26,000 feet after electrical power was lost. However, the cockpit voice recorder continued operating on battery power until impact.

According to the report, the cockpit voice recorder suffered catastrophic damage in the crash, and no backup copy of the audio had been created. China has also not handed the original recording to US investigators.

Investigators believe it is unlikely that the pilots intentionally shut down both engines and then immediately forced the aircraft into a near-vertical dive. One theory under consideration is that a third person may have entered the cockpit and incapacitated the crew.

The report notes that if one pilot had deliberately cut off the engines, the other would almost certainly have attempted to restart them. The absence of any restart attempt has therefore become a key focus of the investigation.

The renewed attention on the China Eastern crash comes as controversy continues over the preliminary findings into the Air India Boeing 787 disaster.

That report revealed that both fuel control switches on the Air India aircraft had also moved to the cutoff position seconds before the crash.

While several pilots’ organisations in India have called for further investigation into the possibility of electrical or battery-related failures, many aviation analysts believe the evidence increasingly points toward deliberate human action.

The Federation of Indian Pilots has nevertheless demanded a more detailed technical probe, arguing that all possible system failures must be ruled out before any conclusion is reached.

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau is expected to release its final report into the Air India crash before June 12, — one year after the disaster.

-jacob@indianaviationnews.net

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From routine diversion to ‘Mid-Air Horror’: How ignorance distorts aviation reporting

April 21, 2026April 21, 2026 admin Leave a comment

By Jacob K Philip

NDTV on Monday published a textbook case of how sensationalism—and a lack of basic aviation understanding—can distort a routine incident into a dramatic narrative.

This was the headline:

“4 Hours of Mid-Air Horror: Flyers Seen Praying, Crying on Fly91 Flight.”

The introduction followed suit:

Her hands joined in prayer, she sobs quietly at first. Then it escalates—tears streaming, body shaking—as she mutters a prayer. The video, the report says, captures the ‘horror’ of a Fly91 flight in bad weather, with passengers in panic for nearly four hours.

It doesn’t stop there—

Cries of “Oh my God”, punctuated with wails, could be heard on repeat in the shaky video that has emerged.

“Oh s**t…Why is he doing like this,” a man could be heard shouting, the voice relaying the panic and urgency.

“Ro mat, ro mat, kuch nahi hota, ruko (Don’t cry, don’t cry-it’s nothing. Wait),” another voice is heard saying on the video.

After building up such intense drama in the opening paragraphs, when readers continue down eagerly, this is what they would find:

Fly91 flight IC3401, a small regional airline service, took off from Hyderabad at 3:10 PM Sunday, April 19, heading to Hubli in Karnataka. As usual, it reached over Hubli around 4:15 PM. Due to bad weather, the aircraft held at 4,000–7,000 feet for some time. When the weather didn’t improve, the decision was made to divert to Bengaluru. The flight proceeded there around 5:45 PM and landed at 6:45 PM. Later, after weather conditions improved, it departed again around 7:30 PM and finally landed at Hubli at 9:19 PM, disembarking passengers safely.

This routine event—something that happens countless times every year in India during monsoons—was portrayed as a terrifying aerial ordeal, based mainly on the panic of one distressed passenger. The reporter who did this deserves mention; the editor who added such a headline deserves even more.

The story also includes snippets of passenger conversations:

“Ask the pilot to go to Bengaluru. Or we can go to Belgaum at least,” a passenger could be heard saying.

“Yes. It is nearby,” another passenger agreed.

Amid all this unsolicited advice and arguments, the pilot did make an announcement (to be fair, it was included in the report):

“We are holding. We will keep you updated. Have patience, kindly follow instructions.”

Meanwhile, on the ground, family members of passengers were expressing anger at the airline. The report mentions allegations of poor communication, negligence, and lack of care.

And the airline had said this in a statement:

“The flight IC3401 flying from Hyderabad to Hubballi did not develop any technical snag as is being reported in some sections of the media. The flight departed from Hyderabad at 1500 hours. On nearing Hubballi, the flight encountered bad weather due to which the flight was diverted to Bengaluru as per standard protocol. The flight subsequently returned to Hubballi and back to its home base in Hyderabad.”

Turning an ordinary weather diversion into a sensational news could be partly due to preconceived notions too-

Fly91 operates the ATR-72-600, a small turboprop aircraft with a maximum capacity of about 78 passengers. Some people may feel uneasy seeing such a small aircraft. And some others may feel like getting bigger, on finding themsleves in a small aircraft, so that they can even tell the pilots how to fly the plane.

In reality, the holding time between 4:15 PM and 5:45 PM over Hubli and nearby areas could have been an opportunity for passengers to enjoy the view. At 4,000–7,000 feet, one can clearly see rivers, hills, towns, houses, and even vehicles on roads below.

But how can anyone look outside with all the crying and wailing in the cabin?

Now, why did the pilots decide not to land at Hubli?

The real culprit was cumulonimbus (CB) clouds—dangerous storm clouds—present over Hubli at that time.

At 4 PM, rain clouds were already forming at about 1,500 feet. With a temperature of 35°C, such clouds can rapidly become hazardous. By 4:30 PM, thunderclouds and cumulonimbus formations intensified, descending to around 1,200 feet.

By 5 PM, cloud build-up was increasing further. Interestingly, it wasn’t raining yet, so passengers looking outside might not felt the weather was bad.

Visibility was around 5,000 meters, but conditions could deteriorate suddenly—rain could begin anytime, obscuring the runway completely.

Wind direction could shift abruptly across or along the runway. Also, the presence of storm clouds at around 1,500 feet along the approach path is a serious hazard.

In short, even though the conditions didn’t visibly look severe, pilots correctly assessed that the weather could turn dangerous at any moment. That is why they chose not to land and eventually diverted to Bengaluru. And it indeed was a wise decision.

Jacob K Philip is the Editor of Aviation India/Indian Aviation News Net. He can be reached at jacob@indianaviationnews.net

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US confirms crash of $171mn ISR UAV over Arabian Gulf

April 15, 2026April 15, 2026 admin Leave a comment

By Jacob K Philip

It is now clear that the US Navy’s Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton—a remote-controlled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft—which went missing after issuing a distress signal during a patrol of the Strait of Hormuz, has indeed crashed.

The incident occurred on the 9th of this month at 3:42 PM, while it was flying at an altitude of 9,250 feet over the Arabian Gulf between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The loss of the Triton on April 9th has been recorded in the list of this year’s naval accidents on the official website of the Naval Safety Command (https://navalsafetycommand.navy.mil), the safety and security wing of the U.S. Navy. (See the screenshot of the website page).

Although the website states that the information regarding the exact crash location is being “withheld,” it is certain that both incidents are one and the same, as it was on April 9th that the aforementioned Triton squawked 7700 (emergency code) and disappeared over the sea while flying at a low altitude. The website also clarifies that no injuries were reported in the crash of this unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

Notably, the accident has been categorized as a Class A mishap. This category includes accidents resulting in damages exceeding $2.5 million. The current estimated value of this aircraft is $171.7 million (approximately ₹1,604.3 crore as per current exchange rates).

With this, the aircraft with registration number 169804 becomes the first Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton that the United States has officially acknowledged losing in connection with the Middle East conflict.

Additionally, six days before the war began, on February 22nd, another Triton (Registration: 169600) issued a 7700 distress signal during a pre-war surveillance flight and landed at the Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi. While it hasn’t been seen since and can be assumed to be completely out of service, there has been no official confirmation regarding that specific case yet.

Timeline of the April 9 crash:

Mission Phase: After completing its surveillance mission at altitudes between 47,000 and 52,000 feet, the drone was heading back toward Sigonella (Italy).

.
The Descent: Around 3:26 PM, while flying at 52,000 feet west of Al Ju’aymah (north of Dammam, Saudi Arabia), the aircraft suddenly began to lose altitude.

Final Maneuvers: As it descended, the aircraft performed a U-turn. It only began emitting a distress signal several minutes later, by which time it was over the sea north of Qatar. It briefly headed back toward Saudi Arabia before turning right toward the Iranian coast.

The Disappearance: It finally vanished from radar over the sea after dropping to an altitude of 9,250 feet.

Jacob K Philip is the Editor of Aviation India/Indian Aviation News Net. He can be reached at jacob@indianaviationnews.net

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Europe Talks Anti-War — But Its Skies Tell Another Story

April 3, 2026April 3, 2026 admin Leave a comment

By Jacob K Philip

The news that Italy and Spain have imposed restrictions on the passage of planes participating in the US war against Iran, and that Austria has rejected Trump’s demand to open its airspace, has led to the perception that the whole of Europe is gradually turning against the Middle East war.

However, the fact is that there has been no new restriction from Europe that would cause any significant inconvenience to the United States since the war began on February 28. It is just that Switzerland and Austria have never given permission to any country’s warplanes in the past, and they still do not.

*Tankers and transport planes of the USAF flying to and from the Middle East evade Austria, Switzerland*

Although Italy and France have recently started saying that they have imposed restrictions, in reality that has not caused any significant disruption to US military aircraft movements.

The skies of the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Greece, Ireland, Finland and Sweden are still open.

Though the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia say they allow military aircraft to fly over their airspace only under certain conditions, tracking sites show defense aircraft of all hues and colours flying freely through their skies to the Middle East.

Unlike these countries, Austria and Switzerland have very different reasons for keeping fighter jets out.

After World War II, to regain its sovereignty, Austria, which was occupied by the Allies (the US, the Soviet Union, the UK and France), had to agree to the condition that it would remain a neutral, non-aligned country like Switzerland. It is still not a member of NATO and does not allow foreign military bases because of this treaty.

So Austrian leaders could not have allowed US warplanes to fly over their airspace even if they had wanted to.

The neutrality policy of Switzerland, located in the heart of Europe, was decided by the European countries of Austria, Russia, Prussia, the UK and France at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 after the fall of Napoleon. They strictly keep any aircraft involved in the Iranian attack away from their airspace, with the exception of non-war-related transport aircraft, not because the war is not ethical, but to comply with the Vienna Congress.

Just as I had written before, Italy’s recent aversion to US warplanes is nothing more than a drama to satisfy the growing anti-war and anti-Trump sentiment in the country. Planes carrying personnel and supplies to the war still have no difficulty landing at and taking off from Italian air bases through the many loopholes in its regulations.

Although France’s Macron has stated that he does not believe that the Strait of Hormuz can be opened through military action and that he should not heed Trump’s call to join the US in a war against Iran, the fact is that the skies of France, a NATO member, are always open to US military aircraft.

Then there is Spain.

Although Spain has been speaking out against the war in recent times, the fact is that there is still no significant obstacle for US military aircraft to land at the US naval base in Rota and the Morón Air Base and fly to the Middle East. Although it is stated that aircraft carrying weapons and attack aircraft directly related to the war will not be allowed, as in the case of Italy, these policies are also very flexible and can be relaxed if necessary.

Beyond creating an impression that Europe’s skies are not open enough for warplanes to fly, the anti-war statements of the European countries are of not much significance.

Now, the reason why Trump has repeatedly asked Austria to forget about the old treaty and open up the skies:

It is all about money and time.

If Austria, which is located in the middle of the flight path from US military bases in Europe to the Middle East, were to be avoided, it would mean flying 300–500 kilometres more each way. This means that the flight time of military tankers and transport aircraft would be 20–45 minutes longer. In the case of tanker aircraft, this means 2–4 tons more fuel would be burned. And it is not a handful of aircraft that fly along this corridor day and night to the Middle East.

Whatever it is, don’t forget that Trump is ultimately a businessman with a clear sense of profit and loss.

Jacob K Philip is the Editor of Aviation India/Indian Aviation News Net. He can be reached at jacob@indianaviationnews.net

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West Asia Conflict: Surprisingly Low Airpower Losses — Or Just the Visible Tip?

April 2, 2026April 2, 2026 admin Leave a comment

By Jacob K Philip

How many military aircraft/remotely controlled aircraft/drones have both sides lost in the West Asia war so far?

While it is true that the first casualty in a war is truth and facts, there are still some figures that can be confirmed as of April 2, a month and three days after the war began.

If we sift through all the information spread by both sides’ news channels, newspapers, and especially social media, it can be seen that the reliable numbers are, five aircraft and 60 remotely controlled aircraft/drones.

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Aircraft:

1. A US Air Force Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft.
-Crash on March 12 while flying over western Iraq
2. A US Air Force Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft (registration 81-0005).
-Destroyed by an Iranian missile on March 27 while parked at Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia.
3. Three US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jets were accidentally shot down by the Kuwaiti Air Force near Al Jahra, Kuwait, on March 1.

Total 5.

Drones, Remotely Controlled Aircraft:
1. US MQ-9 Reapers – 12
Shot down and damaged during the attack.
2. US MQ-9 UAVs – 5
3. US MQ-4C Triton – 1
This Northrop Grumman MQ-4C remotely piloted-reconnaissance aircraft, registration 169660, has not flown since it made a distress call and landed at Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi on February 22.
4. Iranian attack drones (such as the Shaheed) – 40
This is not a complete count. This is because many drones are launched together and many drone interceptions go unrecorded.
5. Israeli Hermes and Heron UAVs – 2
This is also not a complete count. This is because very little information is publicly available about most of Israel’s drones.

A total of 60.

Although the total loss of aircraft and drones has so far been confirmed to be 65, it is widely reported that seven US fighter jets, four AWACS aircraft, three tankers, four transport aircraft and 20 UAVs (such as the MQ-4C Triton) have been destroyed.

These are reasons why these claims cannot be confirmed –

1. No debris from the crashed aircraft have been found anywhere
2. There are no satellite images of the aircraft that are said to have destroyed while parked at airbases.
3. There were no known search and rescue operations after the aircraft went down.
3. There are also no reports of capture of the crew of the aircraft that are claimed to have been shot down, alive or dead.

The mere fact that the aircraft has not been seen on tracking sites does not prove that the aircraft has crashed. During war, such aircraft may fly completely invisible—with their transponders turned off.

There are two reasons why Iran’s losses are not complete.
The first is that Iran has only fielded a few aircraft, just because they have very few fighter planes. And in the present theatre of war, Iranian aircraft do not penetrate and attack enemy areas. Their primary weapons are all missiles and drones. As mentioned earlier, since many drones are launched at once, the number of losses can often be inaccurate.

The reason why Israel’s aircraft losses are not counted is because of the very strict censorship that exists there. Moreover, the fact that the frontline fighters in this war are the United States, is also minimizing and hiding Israel’s air losses.

Jacob K Philip is the Editor of Aviation India/Indian Aviation News Net. He can be reached at jacob@indianaviationnews.net

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Who Started the 2026 Iran War? What Tanker Planes Reveal

March 10, 2026March 10, 2026 admin Leave a comment

By Jacob K Philip

The movements of US Air Force planes in January and February suggest that the United States had not decided when to go to war—or maybe even whether to go to war—with Iran until the day before the attack, and that it was Israel that unilaterally launched the attack on February 28.

It is the Boeing KC-135R Stratotanker aircraft, which refuel fighter jets mid-air, that returned to the United States in two batches in January and February from the US military base at Al Udeid, Qatar, that provide this insight into how the war began.

*Tankers returning to the US from Al Udeid base, Qatar, on January 24.*

Flight-tracking sites show that four tankers with registration numbers 58-0109, 58-0057, 59-1506 and 57-1441 flew back to various US bases from the Al Udeid military base in Qatar on January 24, and five tankers with registration numbers 60-0356, 58-0018, 58-0042, 59-1508 and 63-8020 returned on February 10.

The tankers that appeared to be moving out of Al Udeid US base in Qatar on Janury 14. Of these five tankers returned to US during February 9, shows Flightradar24.

Note the dates January 24 and February 10.

As the threat of war grew stronger by the day, Trump said on January 23 that he hoped military action would not be necessary against Iran.

The first batch of tankers returned to the US the next day.

The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan jointly called on February 9 for the conflict not to escalate and for war to be avoided.

The next day, February 10, five more tankers returned to the United States.

It is clear that, because the United States had not decided conclusively in favour of war despite the increasing tension in West Asia, the fuel tankers—indispensable for air warfare—were sent back to their home bases 11,000 kilometres away.

Although things were becoming more complicated even as the second batch of tanker planes were flying back to the United States, there was still no sign that the United States had reached a final decision to go to war.

The mediator, Oman, was also saying that things were progressing smoothly.

While rapid military moves continued, by February 16 Trump had said that the US would retaliate if Iran attacked. But the second round of Iran-US talks in Geneva on the 17th ended with a decision to prepare guidelines for further talks.

The third round of talks was held on the 26th in Switzerland at the residence of the Omani ambassador to the UN. After the talks, Iran announced that it would not stockpile enriched uranium and would allow IAEA inspections. Later, the Omani foreign minister said that good news might be available soon.

The next day, on February 27, although Trump said he was not happy with the position taken by Iran in the talks and that military action remained an option, he stopped short of saying that a final decision on war had been made.

However, 24 hours later, on February 28, Iran was attacked without warning.

Some believe the US was preparing for the February 28 attack while creating the impression that it was not, by hiding most of its war preparations and by participating in the nuclear talks.

That was quite possible, given the history of deception and wartime tactics associated with both Israel and the United States.

However, the trajectory of the tankers in question during these days paints a different picture.

After the en masse return of tanker planes to the US on January 24 and February 10, they appeared to be returning to West Asia only hours after the war began, that is, during early morning of February 29.

The return of tanker convoys continued until March 3.

*Tanker planes coming back to West Asia early morning of February 29.*

*Tanker planes returning to West Asia on March 3.*

If the intention had been to mislead Iran into believing there would be no war, there would have been no need for the tankers to fly all the way back to the US. After flying out of the Middle East with their transponders on, they could simply have returned to US bases in the Gulf in invisible mode (after turning off their transponders).

Remember that these planes never returned to West Asia before the war, even though the talks mediated by Oman, which lasted until February 27, were oscillating between failure and success.

The fact that the return flights began only hours after the attack indicates that the war that started on the morning of February 28 was unexpected for the United States.

There is another reason to believe that Israel pushed the hesitant United States into the war by carrying out the first attack, which killed Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Eliminating the leadership of the attacked country at the very beginning of a war is considered a distinctive Israeli strategy.

And the F-35I Adir, a stealth fighter jet that many defence experts believe was used in the attack, is operated not by the United States but by Israel.

This aircraft is capable of conducting long-range attack missions without the need for in-flight refuelling. If refuelling was needed at all, Israel had Boeing 707 Re’em tankers. In other words, they did not have to rely on American Stratotankers.

Two hours after the first attack that killed Khamenei and other leaders, the Minab school attack—which killed 180 people, mostly girls—took place, marking the entry of the United States into the war that had been started by Israel.

Jacob K Philip is a Kochi based aviation analyst and honorary editor of Aviation India. He can be reached at jacob@indianaviationnews.net

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Jacob K Philip is the Editor of Aviation India/Indian Aviation News Net. He can be reached at jacob@indianaviationnews.net

Jacob K Philip is the Editor of Aviation India/Indian Aviation News Net. He can be reached at jacob@indianaviationnews.net

Jacob K Philip is the Editor of Aviation India/Indian Aviation News Net. He can be reached at jacob@indianaviationnews.net

Jacob K Philip is the Editor of Aviation India/Indian Aviation News Net. He can be reached at jacob@indianaviationnews.net

Jacob K Philip is a Kochi based aviation analyst and honorary editor of Aviation India. He can be reached at jacob@indianaviationnews.net